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Soft Power with a Hard Edge: EU Policy Tools and Energy 
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Abstract 
International security debates surrounding the European Union energy supply challenge 
commonly invoke the need for more EU hard power – e.g. getting tough on Russia or 
engaging directly with other exporters. This article investigates whether what might be 
labelled ‘soft power with a hard edge’ instead amounts to a consistent policy strategy for 
the EU. The central argument is that the EU has turned a weakness into a strength, and 
developed a set of tools that sharpen the way soft power is exercised in the energy sector. 
The article explores how soft power affects companies that ‘come and play’ on the EU 
market: the rules of the Single European Market and how they affect external firms. It 
also assesses the long reach of the SEM: both the gravitational ‘pull’ the SEM exerts in the 
‘near aboard’, and the EU’s ‘push’ to facilitate the development of midstream 
infrastructure and upstream investment. The conclusion is that the EU regulatory state is 
emerging as an international energy actor in its own right. It limits the ways states like 
Russia can use state firms in the geopolitical game; and it exports its model into the near 
abroad thus stabilizing energy supply and transit routes. 
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"Soft power is the velvet glove, but behind it there is always the iron fist" 
Robert Cooper (2004), 
(then) Director-General for external relations and political- 
military affairs, EU Council Secretariat 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
The European Union (EU) is usually described as a civilian – or soft – power: an economic 
giant but a military dwarf. The reason for this lies in the EU’s lack of ‘hard power’ policy 
tools:  it does not have sizeable armed forces under joint command, a substantial federal 
budget or direct control of firms. Its ability to use ‘hard power’, by means of coercion and 
payment (Nye 2004), are limited. Indeed, very little power is centralised at the EU-level. 
However, the present article argues that the EU's soft power comes with a hard edge. The 
EU’s ability to exert more than mere soft power is a consequence of its attractiveness as 
a USD 17.3 trillion economy and the world's largest single market; and it is brought to 
bear by a policy entrepreneur with a well-stocked regulatory toolbox: the European 
Commission. Indeed, although its international military and economic power may be 
limited, the EU features a formidable regulatory state. Its Single European Market (SEM) 
operates on a liberal, rule-based model. In EU competition policy, the European 
Commission has a powerful tool to enforce this model, albeit directed as much at firms 
as at governments. The central point here is that this tool reaches well beyond the 
borders of the EU.  
 
The SEM exerts soft power inasmuch as it attracts non-EU companies to ‘come and play’ 
on the EU’s turf and accept its rules as the price for access, or when neighbouring states 
voluntarily choose to adopt EU rules and regulations as their own. However, to the extent 
that the European Commission – the EU's SEM watchdog – uses these rules purposefully 
to target external firms, this soft power acquires a hard edge. By these means, the EU can 
1 The authors would like to thank the participants of discussions, panels and workshops at the 55th ISA 
Annual Convention 2014, the Harvard Belfer Center and the Centre for European Studies of Australian 
National University, and three anonymous reviewers for valuable input and feedback. 
                                                 
and does use its regulatory toolbox to foster strategic goals in the near abroad and at the 
global level.  
 
We use energy security as a critical case for testing the 'hard edge' argument about the 
EU's power on the international stage, and its role in the international political economy 
of energy. For one, energy security is one of the key policy challenges that the EU faces 
today. The problem is not so much that the EU imports more than 50 per cent of its 
primary energy (Eurostat 2012), but rather that, unlike the USA, its energy imports do not 
come in the shape of reliable supply at affordable prices (Yergin 2006). Even before the 
'revolution' in unconventional oil and gas put the USA on a trajectory towards net import 
independence, the country imported much of its oil and gas from Canada (with significant 
additional imports coming from Mexico), thus having a much higher share of secure 
energy supply than that which the EU achieves through imports from neighboring 
Norway. The prospect for remedies by way of unconventional oil and gas in the EU are far 
slimmer than public debate suggests, for reasons of local politics, geology, technological 
feasibility and regulatory frameworks (Stevens 2010). An additional, ‘midstream’, 
challenge for the EU lies in the management and operation of transit pipelines (Stulberg 
2012).  
 
As a series of 'gas disputes' between Russia and the Ukraine has vividly demonstrated, 
conflict involving the owner of crucial supply infrastructure can present great risk for 
European consumers. The fact that many of the third-country firms involved are state-
owned gives the EU’s company-targeted power a political dimension that is stronger in 
the energy sector than in the case of non-strategic industries. Besides bringing Europe's 
import dependence back into political debates, the 2014 Ukraine crisis unfolding in 
conjunction with Russia's annexation of the Crimea once again highlighted Europe's 
exposure to supply risks relating to Eastern transit routes.  
 
Second, although energy is a private good, and traded as such in the EU, it is not a 
commodity like any other. Not only does it have public goods dimensions; some of its 
public goods characteristic are also of a strategic nature. Like almost no other commodity, 
energy has therefore been at the center of power struggles, international conflict and 
realpolitik (Abdelal 2013; Colgan 2013). For an import dependent economic bloc such as 
the EU, reliable energy supplies are vital for military security, economic prosperity and 
human welfare. Unlike the market for shoes, the market for molecules cannot be allowed 
to fail. This makes energy policy a good case for studying the external nature of the EU 
regulatory state, and for investigating whether what might be labelled ‘soft power with a 
hard edge’ can amount to a consistent and realistic policy strategy. Critics who call for a 
more proactive ‘hard power’ approach to energy security (Youngs 2009) tend to see the 
Commission’s perception of security of supply as a question of market failure as a 
weakness and a source of its inability to address the energy security concerns of its 
eastern member states. We suggest that the Commission’s approach to this question is 
linked to the EU’s nature as a ‘regulatory state’, and that the ‘hard edge’ of its policy tools 
is derived from its ability to target third-country firms.  
 
The article is organized in three parts. The first part extends the debate on soft and hard 
power to the EU, and operationalizes this for energy security. Although the EU’s quest for 
energy security includes important internal dimensions in the shape of reduction of 
demand (improved energy efficiency) and increased domestic production (more nuclear 
or renewable power), we focus on the more pressing question of managing external 
security of supply in oil and gas in the face of geopolitical instability. The second part of 
the article explores the nature of ‘soft power with a hard edge’: the rules of the SEM, how 
they are applied, how they affect external actors, and how they take into account the 
‘strategic good’ aspect of energy. The third part discusses the long reach of the SEM: the 
gravitational ‘pull’ as the SEM regime influences policy making in the ‘near aboard’ as well 
as the EU’s ‘push’ to improve midstream transit infrastructure and upstream investment. 
The final section returns to the question of what this means for the EU as an international 
actor.  
 
2. Soft and Hard Power, Policy Tools and Energy Security  
 
The EU's toolbox is primarily defined by its nature: the EU is a ‘regulatory state’. Although 
the European Economic Community was established after the Second World War as part 
of a wider set of West European institutions designed to promote security, democracy 
and prosperity, the organisation’s mandate was to pursue these goals largely by economic 
integration. More to the point, this would be rule-based economic integration: 
governance by regulation rather than direct intervention in the industry or the economy. 
Accordingly, the Commission’s main policy tools are regulatory (Lodge 2008; Majone 
1996; Moran 2002). They are designed to make economic agents alter their behavior, in 
order to correct market failures and to ensure proper market functioning (Begg 1996). 
This comes with the clear notion of regulation as a precondition of capitalism, with states 
(and their regulatory actions) creating markets at first place (Wilks 1996). In short, as a 
regulatory state the EU seeks to create markets and to make them work efficiently. Most 
states have a wider set of policy tools at their disposal. These include not only to authority 
to make rules, but also the financial resources needed to provide incentives or subsidise 
production of goods and services, and organisational resources in the shape of 
bureaucracies, armies and nationally owned industries and public services (Hood 1983; 
Solomon 2002). As a regulatory state, the EU has the former, but lacks the latter two.  
 
Because of its focus on markets – and, as a corollary, as a result of its (limited) policy 
toolbox – the EU is typically boxed into the category of an actor that almost exclusively 
exerts 'soft power'. In the realm of 'hard power', by contrast, the EU level is usually 
diagnosed with an ‘expectations-capability gap’ (Hill 1993), a function of both lack of tools 
and lack of political will or consensus. More specifically, the EU can deploy hard power 
only if all states agree (or agree to not block this), and a few of the big states – in effect 
the UK or France – will provide the necessary hardware. The crisis brought about by 
Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimea illustrated the point: the EU agreed on sanctions, 
but required time to build consensus on this and started with more modest steps than 
the USA. However, the EU has one policy tool that can be wielded by a single actor, 
without the need for cross-member state agreement on every action: the Commission’s 
enforcement of the rules of the Single European Market in its capacity as the executive 
arms of the EU’s regulatory state. Much of the focus in this article is therefore directed at 
the Commission’s use of the available policy tools. 
 
The distinction between hard and soft power in international relations, elaborated by 
Joseph Nye (2004), is based on the contrast between coercion used by a state and backed 
by the threat of military or economic force one hand, and the way a state influences world 
politics because of the attractiveness of its culture, values and even the very legitimacy 
of its foreign policy on the other. In Nye’s own words: “simply put, in behavioral terms, 
soft power is attractive power” (Nye 2004), 6); or, focusing on the policy tools used, “the 
ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than 
coercion and payment” (Nye 2008), 95). Nye's work builds on a sociological tradition of 
thinking about power as more than mere direct use of force. For example, in the 1960s 
Schattschneider (1960) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962) elaborated on the importance of 
the power to structure alternatives. A decade later Lukes (1974) added ideological power 
in these sense of the ability to shape or influence what other actors want and desire. His 
distinction between tools (coercion, payment, attraction) and resources (military and 
economic, and culture, values and legitimacy), allows Nye to note that the military and 
economic resources normally associated with coercion and payments can also be used to 
attraction.  
 
This article is far from the first to explore the grey areas between hard and soft power. 
Indeed, Nye himself emphasises that hard and soft power is a continuum, not a dichotomy 
(2004). The spectrum of behaviour thus runs from command, coercion, and inducement 
on the hard side, to agenda-setting, attraction and co-optation on the softer side, but also 
includes a range of options in between and through combining different tools. Likewise, 
all three ‘faces of power’ come in both hard and soft varieties (Nye 2011). The related 
‘smart power’ debate (Armitage and Nye 2007; Nye 2009; Wilson 2008) explores the 
room for combining hard and soft power, with the ‘smartness’ entailing integrated 
strategies that combine the tools and resources of both, and require ‘contextual 
intelligence’ (Nye 2011; Nye 2008). For the case of the US this means  to focus on 
international institutions, development, public diplomacy, free trade and US leadership 
in combating climate change and energy insecurity (Armitage and Nye 2007).  
 
These notions clearly also resonate in both political and academic debates on EU power. 
Catherine Ashton, then the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy put it succinctly: "the EU is not a state or a traditional military power. It cannot 
deploy gunboats or bombers. It cannot invade or colonise. It can sign free trade 
agreements or impose sanctions only when all 27 states agree. […] the EU has soft power 
with a hard edge – more than the power to set a good example and promote our values. 
But less than the power to impose its will” (Ashton 2011). Robert Cooper, the EU Council's 
former Director-General for external relations and political-military affairs, saw the EU as 
a civilian power, but with its exercise of soft power dependent on a track record of 
protecting its member states and successfully achieving its goals: “Hard power and soft 
power are two sides of the same coin. […] There is no soft power without hard power” 
(2004), 1749-180). Pointing to a broad range of soft or 'civilian' instruments for projecting 
international influence, some scholars also allude to the EU as ‘smart power’ (Moravcsik 
2010) and 'normative power' (Laïdi 2008; Sjursen 2006; Whitman 2011) (see also (Hyde-
Price 2006).  
 
In order to further theorize about the notion of soft power and its possible 'hard edge', 
we draw on Barnett and Duvall's (2005) insights about power in international relations 
and the application of this type of analysis to the EU. Emphasizing social relations, Barnett 
and Duvall note that power involves the ability to shape the capacities of other actors, 
and that this can be done both directly (compulsory power) and indirectly. A direct 
exercise of power comes closest to Nye's classic form of hard power. Indirect forms 
include the ability to shape the settings in which actors operate (institutional power), the 
very identity of social actors (structural power), or even the way global politics is 
interpreted and given meaning (productive power). For example, the EU’s use of 
conditionality for applicant states can be considered institutional power: it is indirect and 
works only because of the EUs overall power of attraction. By contrast, the EU's use of its 
trade power (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006) comes closer to Barnett and Duvall's 
compulsory power: here power is a function of the EU's sheer economic strength that can 
be directly targeted at states or other actors. An important point with respect to the 
debates about the EU’s power therefore is that power can be used actively and directed 
at given targets, but also used passively without a designated target. 
 
The EU's trade power ranges from solely exporting goods, to exporting the very rules 
based upon which these goods are traded.  As Meunier and Nicolaidis’ (2006) argue, 
"[t]he EU speaks the language of shared norms developed through consensus and co-
operation. [...] trade power is about using 'carrots' and 'sticks' to enforce such norms on 
trading partners" (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006): 920). As Zielonka (2008) has argued, this 
makes the EU an ‘empire by example’ partly because of its ability to exercise economic 
power for political ends, an approach which "seems most effective when its power is 
overwhelming and its norms are shared" (Zielonka 2008):482); (see also Lavenex (2014): 
886). This is soft power, where trading partners agree to operate under certain rules or 
norms. However, the EU can also direct its economic power at specific target, when it 
demands compliance with its own rules as the price of access to the Single European 
Market. Importantly, it is not only governments and international organizations that 
present themselves as a target of the EU's economic power, but also other actors such as 
firms (Damro 2012): 690). 
 
In light of this, Damro (2012) coined the term 'market power Europe', to capture the way 
the EU "exercises its power though externalization of economic and social market-related 
policies and regulatory measure" (Damro 2012): 682). As a concept 'market power 
Europe' emerges an alternative to the – in Barnett and Duvall's categories 'structural' or 
even 'productive' – argument of the EU as a 'normative power'. Similar to Meunier and 
Nicolaidis, Damro conceptualizes the EU as an international actor whose power derives 
from its explicit efforts to use its sheer economic weight in order to extend its own liberal 
principles to the international stage, notably through regional and global trade. Following 
Daniel Drezner (2007), Damro notes that countries have also chosen to align with EU 
regulatory regimes and standards, even absent any direct EU pressure. This is a function 
of EU market size. Examples include the GSM mobile telephony standard  (cited by Damro, 
see also (Pelkmans 2001). Similarly, Sweden's decision in the early 1990s to adopt EU 
competition policy rules to an extent that went beyond requirements for the run-up to 
EU membership followed a dialogues between the government and industry about the 
benefits of a single set of rules for the national and EU level (Sitter 2001). This is what 
Lavenex (2014) labels a form of passive use of power, or structural power in Barnett and 
Duvall’s typology, as "third countries adopt rules not because the EU asks them to but 
because they fear the costs from not doing so" (887).  
 
The mechanisms of rule diffusion at work here are indirect and comprise learning, 
socialization and technocratic cooperation in policy networks, as well as emulation and 
competition. As the Swedish case shows, it can also include an element of bottom-up 
pressure from industry on a non-member state (or applicant state) to adopt the EU’s rules 
and procedures at home to reduce transaction costs. Yet all mechanisms serve the EU's 
overall purposes in foreign policy and trade more generally, and its sectoral preferences 
more specifically. Importantly, market might coupled with transactions costs and the 
ability to sanction non-compliance with EU regulatory requirements (notably through the 
Commission), allows the EU to also exert direct influence in crucial global policy areas. 
Bradford (2012) therefore argues that the EU has acquired 'unilateral power to regulate 
global markets' (3), i.e. the ability to export its laws and regulations beyond its borders by 
way of market mechanisms. The EU disposes of significant 'extraterritorial regulatory 
capacity' (Bradford 2012), 22), notably with a view to foreign companies whose economic 
actions may have impact on EU market affairs or functioning.  
 
In short, the EU’s economic power can result from the EU’s mere existence and the size 
of its market, and work through less coercive mechanisms; but it can be also directed at 
specific targets, involve conditionality and exert extraterritorial impact through 
regulatory and sanctioning authority. This finding stands in contrast to the hard/ soft 
power debate, even if ‘hard and soft’ is not understood purely as a dichotomy. Essentially, 
hard power involves a situation marked by conflict of interest, in which one actor coerces 
or induces the other to act (or not) in a particular way, by means of economic or military 
resources. By contrast, in the case of soft power, an actor gets its way  by way of the 
attraction of this values, institutions or ideology. Neither of the two ideal-types obviously 
captures the way the EU exerts external (economic) power. The EU exerts hard power 
when it makes other countries or foreign firms adopt EU rules or standards, even though 
it does not do so in a direct and targeted way. At the same time, the EU's economic power 
may prevent another actor from exercising hard power through economic tools. This 
situation may involve a conflict of interests and be of coercive nature, but clearly the 
exercise of power is indirect or passive. On the other hand, the EU can also exert targeted 
influence on companies or governments based on the overall attraction of the EU market 
and its rule-based model. The costs of non-adoption are a case in point: third parties may 
decide to resist EU regulatory diffusion (and the policy agendas coming with it), but this 
may come with direct effects on their ability to operate within or with the EU. This extends 
to conditional access to the Single Market: unless companies or governments have a 
viable alternative to becoming part of or operating in the EU market, conditionality 
becomes a direct (and hence targeted) way of exerting soft power.  
 
In order to account for the distinct way the EU exerts power in international energy 
politics and markets it therefore becomes imperative to differentiate both between 
power that is based primarily on coercion and attraction, and  whether this power is 
directed at a given target or not. That way all attributes of the power debate can be 
combined in new ways, thus shedding more light on  the grey area between hard and soft 
power. In Figure 1 we therefore suggest two additional analytical notions: ‘passive hard 
power’, i.e. hard power that is not directed at a given target; and 'soft power with a hard 
edge', i.e. power based on attraction that features some degree of conditionality.  
 
Figure 1: Soft Power with a Hard Edge 
 
 Coercion  Attraction  
 
Targeted and 
intentional  
 
 
Hard Power 
(target: governments) 
 
 
Conditional Soft Power, 
aka Soft Power with a Hard Edge  
(target: governments and firms) 
 
 
 
Non-targeted  
 
 
Passive hard power  
(target: none) 
 
 
 
Soft Power  
(target: none) 
 
 
The upper left and lower right cells in table 1 are the classic cases of hard and soft power. 
The central, defining, feature of hard power is coercion. This can come in the shape of 
outright commands, or work through economic incentives. Hard power can also be 
exerted by depriving the targets of economically viable policy alternatives. In the standard 
version of hard power, this involves one actor (usually a government) telling another what 
to do or to refrain from doing. By contrast, the key to soft power is its element of 
attraction. Here, voluntary behaviour drives the choices of the target actor who is at the 
receiving end. Moreover, whereas coercion involves a specific target, attraction can apply 
across the board without a single, designated, target. For example, US values (notably 
democracy) and products (Rock 'n' Roll and Coca Cola), derive their attractiveness from 
their universal character, and from the fact that they resonate with societies and 
individuals across the globe.  
 
Hard power has long been the most common type of power exerted in the international 
energy sector. Cases in point include the establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
as a means to safeguard British dominance over Middle Eastern energy reserves; Western 
support of the cartel of the 'Seven Sisters' to secure control over oil producers and rents 
(Yergin 1991); the First Gulf War (whose link to oil remains debated); and the American 
presence in the Persian Gulf in the shape of the Fifth Fleet,  with a view to keeping the 
Strait of Hormuz open to international crude trade (Noreng 2006), xv). For the EU, hard 
power in the energy sector lies with the member states, rather than at the ‘federal’ level. 
To the extent that bilateral energy deals qualify as hard economic power, these are 
concluded between EU countries and third suppliers. More unambiguous forms of hard 
economic power include EU member states maintaining national oil companies (NOCs) or 
backing private companies (national champions), and lending them government support 
for commercial activities. For example, strong diplomatic ties with the Gaddafi regime 
allowed ENI to develop large scale upstream activities in Libyan oil and gas (Willey 2012). 
Moreover, ‘state flanking’ can be a form of hard power when national 'energy champions' 
'go out' and acquire energy assets in third countries. A case in point is China's 
controversial 'energy diplomacy' in Africa (Alden, Large, and Oliveira 2007; Evans and 
Downs 2006). Finally, some armed interventions in the Middle East and Africa have been 
motivated by more than purely humanitarian rationales. For instance, critics have linked 
France's military engagement in the Central African Republic to energy interest, more 
specifically to Areva's interest in uranium mines there.2  
 
2 This has been dismissed as conspiracy theories by observers. Hibbs, Mark. 2013. Uranium in Saharan 
Sands: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/22/uranium-in-saharan-sands/f4ej. Accessed on 27 February 
2014. 
                                                 
Moving to the lower left quadrant, this represents a situation where hard power 
resources, by their mere existence, provide a shield against an adversary's ability to use 
hard power. This is why it is labelled ‘passive hard power’. In the energy sector, a striking 
contemporary example is the shale oil and gas 'revolution'. The surge in domestic 
hydrocarbon production, resulting in lower import needs, has  lowered US’ exposure to 
the risk of external suppliers using oil or gas as a (hard power) policy tool. With the 
possible exception of Norway few, if any, European states enjoy a similar shield from hard 
power in the petroleum or gas sector. As a corollary, potential US energy exports resulting 
from a domestic oil and gas glut may check dominant energy exporters such as Russia, 
without the US exercising targeted hard power. Still, this type of power is passive: even if 
US policy makers acknowledge that lower oil prices put pressure on Iran, and might help 
negotiations over that country’s nuclear program, this is a fortuitous effect and not the 
reason for increased US production. 
 
The upper right cell, finally, is the most interesting one, both theoretically and empirically. 
This cell depicts a situation where attractiveness (e.g. of the EU’s large market) is coupled 
with a targeted and conditional policy that controls or restricts access (e.g. the 
Commission’s regulatory governance). In fact, this can be observed empirically both in the 
EU and the USA. Both require third countries or their firms to comply with a given set of 
rules that allows them to gain full access to their (large and attractive) market. In this 
case, they exercise soft (economic) power in ways that are targeted and conditional. 
Importantly, however, whereas the US government has a diverse toolbox at its disposal, 
including soft and hard power tools, for the EU, this kind of conditional soft power is 
usually its main policy tool. By necessity, therefore, the European Commission seeks to 
explore and perfect the various types of soft power instruments, including the type of soft 
power that comes with conditions and requires third parties comply with EU rules and 
regulations. This approach is backed up by the Commission’s clear and strong 
enforcement capacity. In the European energy sector, rules that force external supplies 
of gas to comply with EU competition law when they sell to the SEM is a good example of 
this.  
 
As a big market – indeed the biggest integrated market in the world – the EU is a mighty 
economic player in its own right. By simply existing, it influences the behaviour of firms in 
other countries that want to sell goods on the EU market – from Indonesian palm oil 
producers who need to comply with EU bio-fuels standards, to the Chinese aviation sector 
which recently became subject to European carbon taxes. This attractiveness comes close 
to classic soft power. In this, it surely is passive power. However, economic soft power 
can also be directly targeted at specific actors, particularly firms. For instance, US law can 
require foreign firms to comply with US rules in order to gain market access. The Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act precluded firms that did business with the two named regimes from 
operating in the USA while the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act requires US firms to 
comply with good governance standards even when operating in foreign jurisdictions. 
Foreign firms and governments may even be obliged to comply with US law in their own 
countries, e.g. the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
mandates the US Securities Exchange Commission to enforce compliance with respect to 
‘conflict diamonds’, bribes and even mine safety standards in the Republic of Congo and 
elsewhere. This is not hard economic power in the sense of coercion, let alone the 
exercise of economic power backed up by gunboat diplomacy. It is a matter of giving soft 
power a hard edge, because compliance can only be forced on firms that want access to 
markets.  
 
As the guardian of the Single European Market, the European Commission uses a similar 
type of soft power that is conditional and targeted. Firms that want to come and play on 
the EU market are subject to the full range of the EU’s regulatory powers. The Commission 
can, and does, demand that foreign firms alter their behaviour, and not just their 
products, as the price of accessing the SEM. Still, the EU's soft power, stemming from its 
economic might, remains passive and, as Gray (2011) reminds us, can hardly be 
strategically deployed. The key point here is that the Commission can also give its soft 
power a hard edge, the effect of which can be observed in the shape of behavioral change 
against the targeted actors' own preferences. 
 
At the ‘federal’ EU level, hard power can hardly be observed in the energy sector for the 
simple reason that the EU lacks the cohesion to exercise military and economic hard 
power to secure energy supplies  - a frequent point of criticism among security scholars 
and analysts (Youngs 2009); see also contributions in (Birchfield and Duffield 2011). To be 
sure, the EU has exercised hard power, in the form of counter-terrorist and -piracy 
operations in the Horn of Africa (Operation Atalanta), but not in order to secure energy 
supplies. The EU has also used energy as means and ways of exercising hard power, such 
as the oil embargo on Iran (effective of July 2012) aimed against the latter’s nuclear 
weapons programme, but it has not used hard power for energy-related ends, which 
would point to energy as part of EU grand strategy (O'Sullivan 2013). In short, to the 
extent that European countries use hard power in the energy sector, it is not usually 
mandated or coordinated by the EU; and to the extent that it is EU power, it is rarely hard 
power.  
 
The EU’s soft power, on the other hand, can be effective also with regard to energy 
security. The problem is that it has been most effective where is it least needed, but has 
had a less impressive effect on Russia. If non-member states find it attractive to 
participate in the European integration project, this can give the Commission leverage. A 
good example is Norway joining the European Economic Area, and thus effectively 
becoming a quasi-member of the EU, not because of hard power or inducement 
specifically related to energy but because of the attractiveness of the SEM (Eliassen and 
Sitter 2003). Although this did have an effect on how Norwegian gas was sold to the EU, 
it hardly affected the Norwegian government’s or firms’ willingness to sell gas to the EU 
or the implausibility of a security of supply crisis. Obviously, however, this approach may 
be problematic if the 'target' (e.g. Russia) does not find the EU model attractive. A case in 
point is the EU’s effort to extend its regulatory regime for investment, trade and transit 
to the former Soviet states in the shape of the European Charter Treaty. The treaty 
provides a legally binding framework covering all commercial activities in the energy 
sector and featured a multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, based on the liberal 
trade and regulatory blueprint (Bamberger and Waelde 2007). It eventually failed because 
Russia regarded it as informed by a generally unattractive model, and as imposed at a 
moment of relative geopolitical weakness (Belyi 2009). So whilst Moscow signed the 
treaty in 1994 it never ratified it and pulled out altogether in 2009.  
 
The central argument in the two sections that follow is that the EU has turned a weakness 
into a strength, and developed a set of tools that sharpen the way soft power is exercised 
in the energy sector – both at home and in the ‘near abroad’. 
 
3. Soft power with a hard edge and the regulatory state: the external effects of the 
Single European Market and EU competition policy on firms 
 
The most powerful tool in the European Union’s public policy tool box when it comes to 
governing the SEM – and indeed the energy sector – is competition policy. McGowan and 
Wilks (1995) memorably described competition law as the EU’s first supranational policy, 
and the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (or DG IV, as it then was) as 
effectively a supranational independent regulator. Indeed, DG Competition has emerged 
an agent of further market integration and continuously kept on pushing for deepening 
the SEM. Yet, whilst important sectors such as telecommunication or postal services were 
subject to liberalization measures in the early 1990s, energy remained an exception until 
the end of the decade and well into the 2000s. To be sure, this proved less of a problem 
in oil, which has effectively been traded on an international, fully fungible, market since 
the 1980s. Gas markets, by contrast, continued to be characterised by national 
champions, long-term bilateral contracts, take-or-pay arrangements, and until recently, a 
dominant oil-price-peg and even destination clauses that prevent re-sale of gas.  
 In fact, until 1992, European gas markets were effectively national. Three sets of 
directives, the key legislative act of the EU, were designed to open the EU market 
gradually: the 1998 directive (European Parliament and the Council 1998) allowed states 
to define ‘eligible costumers (i.e. who could access the competitive market)’, limited 
initial opening to 20% of national markets, allowed different regimes for third party access 
to gas pipelines (negotiated or regulated TPA), and accepted a series of derogations and 
exemptions. Take-or-pay contracts – the standard practice in bilateral gas relations with 
non-EU suppliers – were permitted upon decisions by states or their regulatory 
authorities subject to Commission review, as were derogations for emergent markets or 
markets with only one external supplier. The directives of 2003 (European Parliament and 
the Council 2003) and 2009 (European Parliament and the Council 2009) extended 
liberalisation: all states were to adopt a regulated access tariff, establish independent 
regulators, strengthening legal and ownership unbundling of transport from trading 
services, and established a new EU regulatory agency – ACER – from 2010.  
 
The three 'energy packages' had wide ranging consequences for companies that operate 
in the EU downstream market. Now, they must abide by a set of rules made up of the 
general single market regulation, competition law and the three liberalisation packages. 
The key general rules and principles include the EU Treaty’s rules that ban agreements 
between companies that restrict competition (article 101), prohibit the abuse of a 
dominant position (art. 102), promote market opening to competition and dismantling 
national monopolies (art. 106), and restrict state aid (art. 107). They also include 
regulations and case law that operationalize the EU’s rules on mergers and acquisitions, 
non-discrimination, and free movement of goods and services. The Commission enforces 
these principles in the gas market: by the early millennium, it had initiated a number of 
cases initiated against Germany's E.ON Ruhrgas, Spain's Repsol and Gas Natural, and 
Romania's Distrigaz based on allegations of anti-competitive behavior. This marked the 
end of the traditional model in the European downstream natural gas market (De 
Hauteclocque 2008).  
 
Although SEM rules primarily apply to EU firms and third country firms that operate within 
the EU, the Commission’s power of enforcement also reaches companies that export to 
the single market. In other words, the energy 'packages', coupled with SEM rules and 
competition policy gave the European Commission a powerful means also to address 
challenges to European energy supplies, i.e. in the upstream market segment. A major 
case in point was the Commission’s ruling that broke up the Norwegian Gas Negotiation 
Committee – the country’s gas export monopoly – in 2001. To be sure, this was an 
intermediary case because of Norway’s quasi-membership of the EU since 1994. But the 
Commission did not shy away from turning its regulatory big guns also on external 
suppliers such as Russia or Algeria. In the 2000s the Commission had already stopped 
restrictive internal cross-border trade that limited buyers’ freedom to re-sell gas by way 
of territorial restriction clauses, through cases against amongst others Statoil, ENI, and 
Gaz de France. Now it targeted destination clauses and similar mechanisms that had been 
part of bilateral gas contracts with non-EU companies and prevented gas-on-gas 
competition on the EU market. By 2007 major bilateral supply contracts between 
Gazprom on the one side and Italy's ENI, Germany's EON Ruhrgas and Austria's OMV on 
the other, as well as between Algeria's Sonatrach and its European business partners were 
stripped of destination clauses through a mixture of regulation and negotiation (Talus 
2011; Talus 2012).  
 
Coupled with the provision that a company must not simultaneously be involved in gas 
supply and transmission, this meant that the traditional way external suppliers operated 
in the European market had come to an end. What is more, in doing so the Commission 
effectively went against the core of a business model that had cemented the dominant 
role external suppliers enjoyed in their gas relations with individual European countries 
and allowed them to apply what observers have termed 'divide and rule' tactics (Smith 
2008). EU companies that imported gas (e.g Italy's ENEL which imports Nigerian LNG) had 
to comply with this ban as well. This is reflects both the Commission’s interpretation of 
security of supply as a matter of market failure, and the actual policy tools at its disposal. 
 
In September 2011, the Commission took the next step and carried out a dawn raid on 
Gazprom’s German, Czech, Polish, Bulgarian and Austrian subsidiaries and partners, on 
the grounds of suspicion of breaches of EU Treaty articles 101 and 102 in the form of non-
transparent pricing, obstacles to network access, market partitioning and other abuse of 
its dominant position to hinder the liberalisation of EU energy markets (New York Times 
2011). This was followed by an antitrust investigation against Gazprom, launched by DG 
Competition, on 4 September 2012 (European Commission 2012). In 2013, the 
Commission started preparing charges against the Russian monopolist for violating EU 
antitrust laws by hindering the free flow of gas across the EU, operating unfair pricing 
practices and linking the price of gas to the price of oil (Reuters 2013). The focus of 
attention here was on Central Eastern Europe, traditionally the region mostly affected by 
lopsided import dependence and Russian energy politics. Whilst the final ruling is 
pending, observers have noted that this anti-trust case is likely to severely impact on 
Gazprom's ability to maintain a commanding role in European gas supply security (Riley 
2012). 
 
Finally, the in order to ensure that the functioning of the internal market is not unduly 
distorted by external NOCs, the EU’s third energy package included a clause targeted 
specifically at third-country firms – the so-called ‘Gazprom clause’ (European Parliament 
and the Council 2009), art. 11). The measure is in fact not only directed at the Russian 
energy giant, but designed to allow national regulators to take security of supply risks into 
account when certifying third-country firms’ acquisition, ownership and operation of 
transmission networks, and ultimately to withhold certification (Cottier, Matteotti-
Berkutova, and Nartova 2010). As SEM rules require all non-EU gas companies that 
operate in the SEM to register with a local regulator, this effectively amounts to an 
instrument for excluding certain suppliers from market access. For governments that are 
concerned about Russian use of energy as a ‘weapon’ (Smith 2006), this provides a tools 
for dealing with Gazprom’s asymmetric power.  
 
In all, the finding is that the SEM certainly constitutes soft power for the European Union 
with respect to external companies that want to operate on the attractive EU market, 
whether directly or through subsidiaries and partners. This soft power clearly comes with 
a hard edge in the shape of competition law, which is applied on a case by case basis, i.e. 
in a targeted way. It is complemented by special scrutiny applied to potential threats to 
security of supply. That way, the EU forces external suppliers such as Gazprom to change 
their business practices and thus limits the ability of those actors to operate energy deals 
on grounds of broader foreign policy considerations. The very fact that many of these 
firms – notably Gazprom and its counterparts in other former Soviet states and in Algeria 
– are state owned, means that the effects of the EU’s regulatory power is felt by state 
actors too. So whilst it is unlikely that the attractiveness of the EU energy market will 
trigger domestic business lobby against their governments' overall strategy in these 
countries – an effect observed in EU accession states – the Commission's approach 
certainly limits third-country governments’ ability to use their energy companies as policy 
tools in a broader geopolitical contest (which, indeed, is one threat to security of supply). 
 
To be sure, the EU typically communicates its actions in terms of its market integration 
narrative, rather than in geopolitical terms. But clearly the EU's SEM rules – as applied – 
have a strong external dimension; they affect non-EU actors, and often in a targeted way 
rather than across the board. This exercise of EU power is about more than influencing 
what other want (Nye’s ideal-type soft power); it is also about deterring actors from a 
particular course of action and even compelling them to do certain things that is in the 
EU's specific interest - notably supplying the European gas market at terms the EU sets.  
 
4. The long reach of the single market: soft power with a hard edge and policy regimes 
in the near abroad  
 
The SEM also casts a long shadow, and influences energy markets and energy policy far 
beyond its borders. This is predominantly a matter of classic soft power. For example EU 
rules on certification of bio-fuels have a long reach (foreign firms must comply with these 
rules to sell their goods at the EU market). This soft power acquires a hard edge – targeted 
at governments and firms – once the EU manages to export its own rules to the near 
aboard and make a specific region 'play according to its rules'. That way its soft power 
remains limited in geographical reach, and somewhat targeted in outlook. This is far from 
the classical imperialist exercise of hard power, as the EU remains far from sending 
gunboats. Instead, it sends regulators. And only when they are invited. This is the long 
arm of the regulatory state: it primarily influences through attraction – particularly in the 
form of lower transaction cost for firms if third-country governments can ensure that their 
firms face the same rules at home and in the EU – rather than through coercion. At the 
same time, a targeted export of the EU's rule-based sector regulation makes third 
countries and their firms subject to EU policy tools, including their enforcement 
mechanisms.  
 
The Energy Community is a prime example of the EU's attempts to export its rules to the 
near-abroad. This agreement, which dates back to 2005, extends the EU’s internal market 
regulation for energy to South East Europe and the Ukraine. It represents a sector-by-
sector approach to extending the reach of the EU regulatory regime, by way of the 
contracting parties agreeing to implement the relevant part of the EU Aquis 
Communatuire and liberalise their energy markets accordingly. In other words, signatory 
states are obliged to transpose past and future EU directives and regulations into national 
law, including the 2009 Third Energy Package. Unlike the SEM and EEA, it is not subject to 
supranational enforcement. In other words, it is a binding agreement, but without 
sanctions other than suspending a state’s rights under the Community Treaty (Buschle 
2011). To the extent that the assumption is that its signatories will comply in their own 
interest, this is soft power par excellence.  
 
The main narrative used by the EU is again essentially one of market-making: the Energy 
Community exerts a stabilizing effect on the EU's immediate near-abroad which will 
improve the investment climate, attract capital and thus enhance energy security in the 
region. Yet, there is more. For the EU, the Energy Community gains particular importance 
in natural gas, which in both market and geopolitical terms is primarily a regional game. 
It is particularly the transit countries that have become key targets of the EU's approach 
to selective rules export. To date, signatory country Ukraine is home to more than 50 
percent of Russian gas exports to Europe.3 Fully transposing the Third Energy Package 
into Ukrainian law by the 2018 deadline would therefore make a crucial transit corridor 
subject to EU rules (assuming the 2014 political crisis can be resolved without long term 
civil or regional war). The EU has also started official negotiations with Georgia to join the 
Energy Community, another important transit country in the context of the Southern 
Corridor bypassing Russia controlled pipeline infrastructure (European Commission 
2014). This, in turn, stands in stark contrast to the interests of Russia's Gazprom. Gazprom 
is eager to retain unhindered access to the Ukrainian gas network, as it remains vital for 
its gas exports to Europe (Shapovalova 2010). It is also interested in limiting the ability of 
the EU to project its regulatory power onto alternative routes of gas supplies, as this 
would undermine its still dominant position in the European market. Moreover, Energy 
Community signatory states are obliged to implement EU regulation on cross-border 
networks and Third Party Access provisions, which will limit the ability of Gazprom to 
partition markets in South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans and to exclusively service 
them on what some would call arbitrary contractual terms. The obligation to liberalize 
energy markets for all customers by 2015 will give consumers choice, which will likely 
3 Calculations for 2012 based on export data from OAO Gazprom. 2013. Gazprom in Figures 2008—2012. 
Factbook. Moscow. and transit flow data from Naftogaz of Ukraine 
(http://www.naftogaz.com/www/3/nakweben.nsf/0/3375A8575C8884D0C22571010035B9D2/$file/big4.j
pg, accessed 26 February 2014). 
                                                 
further add to turning the balance of (energy market) power away from the incumbent 
Russian monopolist. In short, by installing and supporting the Energy Community, the EU 
exerts strong regulatory impact on non-EU countries and their dominant supplier – 
Gazprom. Its effect amounts to a direct security gain in a region that for both parties –  
the EU and Russia – has again come to be geopolitically contested. 
 
When it comes to fostering transit security the EU also has more robust policy tools at its 
disposal. The Commission contributes to the organisation, finance and regulation of 
energy infrastructure and external pipeline projects (for an overview see Hirschhausen 
(2011). It has allocated EUR 5.85 billion to support trans-European energy infrastructure 
for the period 2014-20, which includes projects enhancing energy security (European 
Commission 2013). Its financial commitment to the planned (and now abandoned) 
Nabucco pipeline included a grant for a feasibility study and EUR 200 million from the 
European Economic Recovery Programme. More significantly, the EU-owned European 
Investment Bank and the EU-supported European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development were prepared to provide loans to the tune of some EUR 4 billion (EBRD 
2010).  
 
The Nabucco project has to be seen in the broader context of the Southern Corridor. Its 
explicit aim was twofold: to improve security supply of gas through upstream and 
midstream diversification to Central Asian gas, and to strengthen the SEM by fostering 
gas-to-gas competition at home. In Nye’s terms, this is a matter or exercising hard 
economic power. From the EU’s point of view, however, its participation in and regulatory 
support of pipeline projects constitutes an effort to solve the public goods dimension of 
energy infrastructure, as “some projects [...] would be [...] unable to attract enough 
market-based finance” (European Council 2011). It therefore serves the purpose of 
making its single (energy) market more attractive, to enhance its competitiveness and to 
provide for consumer choice. As is often the case in European public policy, external 
action involved a combination of EU states, non-EU states, the EU as an international 
organisation, and other IOs (Sitter 2005). The support of gas pipelines therefore rests on 
the mobilisation and voluntary participation of market actors. This clearly qualifies as soft 
power.  
 
Importantly, however, the Commission has not supported the constructions of additional 
pipelines per se, but instead has adopted a targeted approach: it has exclusively 
financially supported projects in the realm of the Southern Corridor. Moreover, it has 
exempted the Nabucco pipeline and (partially) the Nord Stream pipeline between 
Germany and Russia under the Baltic Sea from some Single European Market rules. In 
turn, it has announced that the bilateral deals underpinning the Russia-sponsored South 
Stream pipeline project through the Black Sea – rivalling the Southern Corridor projects – 
were in breach of EU law (Keating 2013). Our assessment therefore is that these initiatives 
represent soft power being given a hard edge.  
 
Finally, the Commission has recently begun to explore a wider range of policy tools that 
come closer to the grey zone between hard and soft power, partly as a consequence of 
the limited reach of its soft power. More specifically, the failure of the Energy Charter 
treaty prompted the Commission to explore alternative routes to export its rules and 
regulatory regime to important upstream and transit countries and/or to cope with the 
strategic goods dimension of gas. On the softer end of the spectrum, the Commission has 
begun to support and coordinate external action in the energy sector, for example by 
sitting on bilateral negotiations between Poland and Gazprom. This officially comes with 
the goal to enhance market liquidity and to help ensure that their deal fits EU rules and 
policy (Bloomberg 2010). Effectively, however, the Commission thus helps the Poles to 
use their economic power, by lending its weight to the negotiating team. On the harder 
end, the EU has started to experiment with new tools such as pooling purchasing power 
vis-à-vis supplier countries, in order to help provide long term security of demand. In 
Nye’s terms, such use of economic muscle to alter the behavior of others lies at the harder 
end of the soft – hard power spectrum. Yet the Commission presents initiatives such as 
the Caspian Development Corporation (CDC) not so much a matter of using monopoly 
buyer strength (monopsony power) to get a better deal from suppliers, but rather as an 
effort ensure that sufficient upstream and pipeline project secure sufficient long-term 
investment (IHS CERA 2010). This addresses a key challenge in the gas sector: for 
investment to take place, security of demand is needed. The CDC has effectively been 
planned as a take-off vehicle – the functional equivalent of a take-or-pay contracts on 
behalf of several EU states, which – in theory – ensures the EU gas market remains 
attractive for suppliers. Moreover, this was a long way from an ‘offer that the target 
countries could not refuse.  
 
In all, the finding is that the gravitational ‘pull’ of the EU single market regime influences 
national governments’ policy making in the ‘near aboard’, while the EU’s ‘push’ to 
facilitate or contribute to securing midstream infrastructure and upstream investment 
rests on a market making agenda. This is what we term the long reach of the EU regulatory 
state. Therefore, and in contrast to Nye’s suggestion that economic power is usually hard 
power (payments, sanctions and bribes designed to compel or deter action), the 
Commission’s approach to energy security demonstrates that in the EU’s case, economic 
power can also be the source of soft power (designed to overcome public goods 
problems) – whether this is targeted or not. Importantly, because policies are deliberately 
targeted at key issues and actors pertaining to natural gas markets – both firms and 
governments – this soft power can come with a harder edge. The central point here is not 
that the Commission (or even the EU) lacks the tools of exercise hard power – to a large 
extent they do – but rather that even when the EU exercises harder forms of economic 
power this is done within a very specific legal and normative context. The legal context is 
shaped by the single market tools of the regulatory state; the normative context is that 
the EU is a political system essentially designed to overcome public goods problems. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In international politics, the EU regulatory state is emerging as an actor in its own right. 
Although the EU member states struggled to agree a common strategy towards Russia 
over the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the Commission – in its capacity as the regulatory 
watchdog of the Single European Market – comes across as a relatively unified actor with 
a considerable policy toolbox at its disposal. This gives rise to a new and different take on 
the EU as a soft power: one that relies on attraction but gives its attractiveness a hard 
edge. This hard edge is directed at both firms and governments, but through different 
mechanisms. As our investigation shows, this external dimension of the EU regulatory 
state is a rather underappreciated aspect of the nature of the EU, and of its 'actorness' in 
the international political economy of energy (see also (Kuzemko et al. 2012).  
 
First, the EU’s soft power with a hard edge is directed at firms inasmuch as the 
Commission can and does oblige third-country firms to play be the rules of the Single 
European Market if they operate in the EU market. In the case of gas, this has forced some 
firms to change their business models, and may have a considerable impact on Gazprom 
depending on how the Commission’s 2013-14 investigation is concluded. When it comes 
to security of supply – and particularly the concerns that the en government may act 
through Gazprom to threaten EU’s eastern member states – the Commission’s policy tools 
and action only allows it to address part of the challenge. The EU can address the threat 
that Gazprom’s dominant market position constitutes to security of supply; and it can 
limit the ways the Russian state can use their state-owned firm as a policy tool in the 
geopolitical game. But it cannot alter the geopolitics behaviour of, let alone the 
preferences of, the Russian government as such. 
 
Second, therefore, the EU’s the EU’s soft power with a hard edge is directed primarily at 
governments inasmuch as the EU seeks to export its rules and support infrastructure 
projects. In the case of gas, this power is conditional on the target states’ finding the EU 
regulatory model attractive, and/or assessing its benefits as outweighing the costs. In 
terms of security of supply on gas markets, this policy tool can address some of the 
challenges, particularly those that are ultimately a question of inadequate supply of public 
goods, whether in the form of regulation, infrastructure or diversity of supply routes.  
 
Third, the EU's soft power coming with a hard edge is all about the market making 
narrative, and about making the internal market work. Almost everything the European 
Commission does in the field of energy policy is designed to complete the Single European 
Market, to extend it to the field of energy and to render it more attractive for suppliers 
and consumers. Consequently, even when dealing with geopolitical challenges such as 
energy security, the European Union primarily exercises soft power (both conditional and 
unconditional), or at most a passive (and rather mild) form hard power. It can prepare for 
emergencies at home, e.g. by regulating for spare storage capacity and supporting 
reverse-flow interconnecting pipelines. It can limit the market power of third-country 
firms, and thus limit the ways governments can use them. It can export its regulatory 
rules. And it can support pipeline diversity.  Rule export, support of crucial infrastructure 
and transit corridors as well as a steady push for expansion of the EU energy regime into 
its near abroad not only enhances the investment climate in upstream projects; it also 
deprives monopoly suppliers of opportunities to use their dominant market position for 
economic or political purposes. This is undoubtedly a significant achievement of the EU 
as an international energy actor.  
 
Fourth, and as a consequence of the above, the EU cannot, through its regulatory tools, 
address its member states’ vulnerability to politically driven supply interruptions, let 
alone engage in a geopolitical contest with Russia on the latter’s terms. The 2014 crisis in 
the Ukraine forcefully drove home this message, and thus illustrated the limits to the EU’s 
power. Regulatory power can directly force firms to change their behavior (or pull out of 
the EU markets); but if a government does not aspire to join the EU’s rule-based regime, 
the EU can only affect that government indirectly. The EU can reduce its own vulnerability 
to others powers’ use of energy as an instrument of hard power, by improving its own 
infrastructure. It can limit Moscow’s ability to use its state-owned energy NOCs as a tool 
of hard power vis-à-vis EU states, by prosecuting firms for discriminatory pricing and 
abuse of dominant position. But the reach of the EU’s regulatory power is not sufficient 
to alter Russia’s behavior in the Ukraine, whether in the form of using gas prices to extract 
political concessions or actually annexing a part of the country. In geopolitical conflicts, 
the EUs regulatory power is no substitute for the hard military power held by the EU’s 
own member states and by NATO. To the extent that the EU can contribute to this game, 
it is by the use of its own hard-power tools such as economic sanctions, not by its 
regulatory power. 
 
All said, the European Union’s soft power with a hard edge extends further than the 
classic post-Cold War hard vs. soft power debate might suggest. Nevertheless, its reach is 
clearly limited. It is more pertinent to gas than oil, because it is traded on regional rather 
than global markets. It is more relevant to the near abroad than more distant countries, 
and more applicable to transit countries than suppliers. The longer the attempted reach 
(in terms of distance), the more specific the tools need to be – as the Caspian 
Development Corporation initiative indicates. Finally, the EU's power is often more 
effective with respect to companies than governments, because its reach depends on 
how receptive the targets are. The EU’s real hard edge comes into play when its policies 
target firms, operators and regulators; not the governments of producer states.  
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